“The Tragedy of the Commons” — a wide range of phenomena arising in, among other things, exploitation of common or interdependent renewable resources — is a very important problem of contemporaneity. Especially in a dynamic context, where it may lead to extinction of a species or depletion of a resource, while even second best cooperation results are in its preservation. It is also crucial in the case of marine resources. Prof. Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel will present the dynamic game models of exploitation of common renewable resources showing various aspects of the problem and remedies against “The Tragedy of the Commons”, including increasing number of players, Pareto (sub-)optimality, enforcement of socially desirable behaviour by a Pigovian taxation and results of distortion of information — belief distorted Nash equilibria. She will also discuss the methodological issues concerning dynamic optimisation and Nash equilibria in dynamic games, including unexpected results of introducing constraints inherent to any extraction problem, and a counter-example to a quite common simpliﬁcation of methodology.
Agnieszka Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel is an Assistant Professor of Institute of Applied Mathematics and Mechanics at the Faculty of Mathematics, Informatics and Mechanics, University of Warsaw. She specialises mainly in game theory and optimal control with applications: large games, games with a continuum of players, dynamic games, differential games, models of common or interdependent resource extraction, game theoretic models of markets, theory of decision making given incomplete, ambiguous or distorted information, which have applications in, among other things, resource extraction, enforcement of cooperation, military telecommunication problems and traffic models. She obtained her PhD in mathematics from Faculty of Mathematics, Informatics and Mechanics, University of Warsaw, while habilitation in economics from Warsaw School of Economics.
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